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12 THE RISK OF WATER STRESS 
Professor Nigel Arnell, Director of the Walker Institute for Climate System Research. 
Water resources are under stress in many regions due to increasing demands and, in places, falling quality. 
Climate change has the potential to change the risks of water stress.1 The focus in this section is on strategic 
definitions of water stress, which are based on generalized indicators of the amount of water that is available 
and the demands on that resource. Operational definitions, on the other hand, are typically based on the 
reliability of the supply of appropriate quality water and are strongly determined by local conditions. 
What do we want to avoid?
The most widely used sets of indicators of high-level water resources stress are based on the ratio of total 
resources to population (‘resources per capita’) and the proportion of resources that are withdrawn for 
human use.2 The first is simpler but does not reflect stresses introduced by high per-capita water use, for 
example where there is significant irrigation for agriculture; on the other hand, data on current and future 
water withdrawals can be highly uncertain.
There are three widely used thresholds for defining levels of water stress on the basis of per capita availability. 
Basins or countries with average annual resources between 1000 and 1700 m3 per capita per year are 
typically classed as having ‘moderate water shortage’, and if resources are below 1000 m3 per capita per year 
then the region is classed as having ‘chronic water shortage’. If resources are below 500 m3 per capita per 
year then the shortage is ‘extreme’.3 The thresholds are essentially arbitrary, although derive ultimately from 
an assessment of exposure to water resources stress in Africa.4 
In 2010, almost 3.6 billion people, out of a global population of around 6.9 billion, were living in watersheds 
with less than 1700 m3 per capita per year (Table W1), and almost 2.4 billion were living in watersheds with 
less than 1000 m3 per capita per year (chronic water shortage).i Approximately 800 million people were 
living in watersheds with less than 500 m3 per capita per year (extreme water shortage). 
i. The methods used here to estimate future risks to water resources are summarised in the Annex.
Table W1: Numbers of people (millions) living in water-stressed watersheds. The 
figures for 2050 are based on a medium population growth assumption, and the ranges 
represent the effects of low and high growth assumptions. 
N. Africa 162 150 94 209 254 (226-326) 244 (213-282) 216 (153-248) 329 (292-383)
W. Africa 54 17 4 309 484 (373-610) 367 (185-489) 37 (20-117) 756 (616-926)
C. Africa 3 0 0 110 11 (10-14) 8 (6-9) 6 (0-8) 239 (202-277)
E. Africa 94 10 2 193 326 (272-441) 299 (159-381) 103 (13-221) 418 (349-496)
Sn Africa 47 20 0 210 186 (133-282) 101 (45-177) 24 (4-35) 488 (396-609)
S. Asia 1,394 1,172 199 1,706 2121 (1,906-2,526) 1,802 (1,512-2,183) 746 (628-1,003) 2,390 (2,151-2,722)
SE Asia 7 0 0 605 27 (25-31) 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 791 (728-889)
E Asia 1,202 691 386 1,546 1084 (1,035-1,184) 643 (613-660) 359 (340-388) 1,434 (1,375-1,510)
Central 1 0 0 46 65 (57-80) 2 (1-2) 0 (0-0) 70 (62-84) 
Asia
Middle 166 93 71 214 356 (295-397) 310 (222-344) 190 (164-209) 379 (339-420) 
East
Australasia 0 0 0 35 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 50 (50-45)
W. Europe 220 123 20 411 220 (239-165) 138 (166-55) 23 (24-15) 425 (441-344)
C. Europe 51 8 0 118 23 (24-20) 1 (8-1) 0 (0-0) 102 (103-96)
E. Europe 20 4 3 221 9 (8-18) 4 (3-4) 4 (3-4) 186 (178-196)
Canada 6 6 0 35 7 (8-5) 7 (8-5) 7 (8-0) 44 (45-31)
US 78 54 27 312 99 (102-75) 74 (76-56) 38 (39-26) 390 (402-303)
Meso- 58 26 0 197 124 (112-154) 61 (53-101) 31 (28-37) 279 (250-346) 
America
Brasil 0 0 0 195 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 0 (0-0) 237 (218-269)
South 15 4 4 198 46 (29-56) 19 (17-25) 6 (5-7) 278 (251-329) 
America
Global 3,576 2,376 809 6,868 5449 (4,853-6,382) 4,079 (3,286-4,774) 1,789 (1,430-2,317) 9,283 (8,444- 
        10,273)
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How will exposure to water stress change in the future?
Through the 21st century, changes in total population will result in changes in exposure to water resources 
stress. By 2050, under a medium population growth assumption,5 the number of people living in watersheds 
with less than 1000 m3 per capita per year will increase to around four billion – a bigger proportion of 
the global population than in 2010. The effects of population growth on the number of people living in 
watersheds with less than 500 m3 per capita per year are even more pronounced: it will double by 2050 to 
around 1.8 billion people. The magnitudes of the changes are influenced to a certain extent by the assumed 
changes in population (as shown in Table W16), but even under low-growth assumptions there are significant 
increases in exposure to water scarcity at global and regional scales.
Climate change will also affect the number of people living in water-stressed conditions. Figure W1 shows 
the change in numbers of people living in watersheds with chronic water shortage (less than 1000 m3 per 
capita per year) through the 21st century, for the globe as a whole and for five regions, under no climate 
change and under two different climate change pathways (RCP2.6 and RCP8.5, low and high greenhouse gas 
emission scenarios respectively). The shaded areas show the range of potential numbers due to uncertainty 
in the pattern of resource change due to climate change. The plots all assume the medium population growth 
projection.
Figure W1: The number of people living in water-stressed watersheds (<1000m3/
capita/year), with and without climate change. The plots show two climate pathways 
(RCP2.6 and RCP8.5). The solid line represents the median estimate of impact for 
each pathway, and the shaded areas show the 10% to 90% range. A medium growth 
population projection is assumed.
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In the absence of future climate change, the numbers of people living in watersheds with chronic water 
shortage decreases in East Asia from 2030, and in South Asia from 2060. If climate change is included, 
it results in more rainfall and river runoff in East Asia. This combines with the reduction in population to 
reduce apparent water shortage – but there is a chance (shown by the shaded area) that climate change 
would slow the reduction in exposure to water shortage. Similarly, Figure W1 shows that climate change 
could substantially increase the number of people living in watersheds with chronic water shortage in south 
Asia – or reduce them. In the US and the Middle East climate change is very likely to increase exposure 
throughout the century, and in North Africa is more likely than not to produce an increase in exposure. 
Calculating risk
Figure W2 shows the risk by region that climate change increases by more than 10% the numbers of people 
living in watersheds with chronic water shortage under the two climate pathways. By 2050, the largest of 
these probabilities are in central Asia, Europe, the USA, Central America and southern America. By 2100, the 
probabilities that exposure to shortage will increase are considerably greater in most regions than in 2050. 
Under the low emissions climate pathway the probabilities are smaller in most regions than under the high 
emissions pathway, particularly by 2100.
CLIMATE CHANGE: A RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT PART 2: DIRECT RISKS 
7978 CLIMATE CHANGE: A RISK ASSESSMENT
RISK ASSESSMENT PART 2: DIRECT RISKS 
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
ri
sk
o
f 
c
ro
ss
in
g
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld 90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
100
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
0
RCP2.6
RCP8.5
Sacramento: risk of falling below 
1700m3/capita/year
Rio Grande: risk of falling below 
1000m3/capita/year
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
ri
sk
o
f 
c
ro
ss
in
g
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld 90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
100
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
20
60
20
70
20
80
20
90
21
00
0
RCP2.6
RCP8.5
Figure W2: The risk that climate change increases by more than 10% the numbers of 
people living in water-stressed watersheds, relative to the situation with no climate 
change, under the two climate pathways. A medium growth population projection is 
assumed.
The risks posed by climate change to water scarcity can also be assessed at the basin scale. Figure W3 shows 
the probability that resources per capita falls below defined thresholds in nine major basins that are, or likely 
will be, exposed to water resources stresses (note that the thresholds vary between basins). The dotted lines 
show probability of falling below the thresholds under the two climate pathways assuming population remains 
at 2010 levels, and the solid lines show probability under the medium growth population projection. The 
difference between the solid and dotted lines represents the effect of population change on probability (and 
of course this difference varies with population projection).
Figure W3: Risk of resources per capita falling below specified thresholds for nine 
illustrative watersheds under two climate pathways (note that the thresholds vary 
between watersheds). The dotted line shows risk with current (2010) population, and 
the solid line shows risk under the medium population growth projection
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What is a plausible worst case for water stress due to climate change?
There are considerable uncertainties in the projected impacts of climate change on water stress, even 
assuming a single projection for changes in population. The chance of impacts exceeding some defined 
threshold – as shown in the previous section – represents one aspect of this uncertainty, but another 
assessment of risk can be based on a plausible ‘worst case’.
By 2050, up to 620 million people may be added to the 4 billion people (Table W1) living in watersheds with 
chronic water shortage, under high emissions and the most extreme climate scenario. Figure W4 shows the 
‘worst case’ by region in 2050, along with the 10th percentile from the distribution of impacts (the upper part 
of the shaded region in Figure W1). In some regions the worst case is little different to the 10th percentile, 
but in others is considerably larger reflecting greater uncertainty in projected impacts. However, the worst 
cases shown in Figure W4 do not occur simultaneously: the global ‘worst case’ is not equal to the sum of the 
regional worst cases. Under no one plausible pattern of climate change does every water-stressed region see 
the maximum reduction in runoff.
Figure W4: Plausible ‘worst case’ impacts of climate change in 2050 on water stress. 
The graph shows the increase in numbers of people living under chronic water shortage 
under the RCP8.5 climate pathway and the medium growth population projection. There 
is a 10% probability that the impact is greater than that shown by the blue dots, and the 
red dots show the maximum calculated impact
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The assessment in Figure W4 is based on the assumption that all the climate models used to estimate impacts 
are equally plausible, and that they span the range of potential regional climate change impacts. This, of 
course, is not necessarily the case. The global-scale impacts are largely dominated by impacts in south and, to 
a lesser extent, east Asia, and are therefore very sensitive to projections of how the south Asian monsoon may 
change (see box on Variation in the Indian monsoon).
Variation in the Indian monsoon
Professor Brian Hoskins, FRS 
In impact studies, it is assumed that the set of available projections of future climate from the state-of-
the-art climate models spans the space of possible climates. In particular, in determining the risk posed 
by increasing greenhouse gases it is assumed that the worst case scenarios in any region are included 
amongst the model projections. However, climate models developed and tested in the context of the 
climate of the 20th century have known deficiencies, some of which are common to most models. Some 
of these deficiencies are likely to influence the simulation of future extreme climate changes. Further, it is 
not clear that the climate models are able to simulate any major climate change due to the crossing of a 
threshold in the climate system that could occur. This could, for example, be of the nature of the onset of 
significant greenhouse gas emissions from melting permafrost, the destabilization of the West Antarctic Ice 
Sheet or a drastic reduction in the overturning circulation in the Atlantic Ocean. Palaeo-climate runs with 
the models show that they are unable to simulate just how different the monsoon systems of the world 
have been in the past. For example the Sahara was green with vegetation some seven thousand years ago. 
However, climate models do not produce this big change in rainfall. One recent study concluded, “State-
of-the-art climate models are largely untested against actual occurrences of abrupt change. It is a 
huge leap of faith to assume that simulations of the coming century with these models will provide 
reliable warning of sudden, catastrophic events.”7
The amazing thing about the Indian summer monsoon is the large effect of a small variation from one year 
to year: 10% more rainfall and there are floods, 10% less and there are huge problems for farmers. In any 
year monsoon active and break periods occur. Breaks that last more than a couple of weeks also cause 
major agricultural problems. Climate models are in general projecting a slight strengthening of monsoon 
rainfall, but it should be recognized that the changes in particular monsoons, such as that in India, could 
be much more significant than this suggests. Given the large perturbation of the climate system due to 
greenhouse gas emissions, we should be prepared that the future Indian Monsoon could have average 
rainfall outside the current normal range, and the variability between one year and another and in the 
active-break cycle could be very different.
What do we know, what do we not know, and what do we think?
Our estimates of future risks are based on (i) projections of regional future climate change, (ii) projections of 
hydrological consequences of climate change and (iii) projections of future population and exposure to water 
resources stress. What happens in practice also depends on future adaptation.
Projections of regional future change depend partly on the assumed rate of growth in emissions and partly 
on the projected patterns of changes in regional and seasonal climate – particularly precipitation. Whilst 
the broad patterns of precipitation changes are reasonably consistent between models, the details and the 
precise magnitudes of change differ. The quantitative estimates of impacts on water stress therefore vary, and 
these tend to be larger than the apparent differences in precipitation change between climate models. This is 
because exposure to water shortage is concentrated in particular regions of the globe, and it is at the local to 
regional scale that the differences between climate models are greatest.
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As climate models improve their representation of atmospheric dynamics and the distribution of precipitation 
then the precise quantitative estimates of impacts on water stress will change, but for years to come 
differences between models will remain and there will therefore be a distribution of potential climate change 
impacts for any one place.
The impacts of climate change on water shortage are assessed by using a hydrological model to translate 
climatic changes to changes in runoff. As with climate models, different hydrological models can give 
different responses to the same input data. Comparisons of the effects of hydrological model uncertainty 
are still in their infancy,8 but early indications are that adding impact model uncertainty adds to the range 
of potential impacts. Moreover, it is likely that hydrological models have similar biases (they all tend to 
overestimate river flows in dry regions, for example) and none yet explicitly incorporate the effects of 
changes in glacier volumes which may affect future resources in some regions.
Projections of future population are also uncertain (as shown in Table W1), because they are based on 
different assumptions about changes in fertility rates, mortality rates and migration. It is not possible to 
assign likelihoods to different population projections, so it is necessary to estimate risks separately under 
different plausible population narratives and projections.
Finally, the actual effects of climate change on ‘real’ water shortages will depend on the management 
infrastructure and institutions which are put in place to cope with water shortage. There is already a very 
considerable difference between developed and developing countries. Some management interventions 
will offset the effects of climate change, but others may not. The effects of future adaptation on the ‘real’ 
consequences of future water shortages will therefore depend on (i) the extent to which adaptation takes 
place (limited by a number of factors including finance and institutional capacity, alongside potential physical 
constraints such as the availability of feasible locations for storage reservoirs) and (ii) how effective the 
adaptation measures are in practice.
Lessons from risk assessment
The key conclusions from this section are therefore:
• Climate change alters substantially the future risk of exposure to water shortages, but the effects are 
strongly exaggerated or reduced by changes in population. Put the other way, the pressures on water 
resources posed by increasing populations are substantially altered – exaggerated or reduced – by 
climate change.
• Climate change reduces the probability of exposure to water shortages in some regions – particularly 
in parts of east and south Asia - but this may be associated with substantial changes in flood risk (see 
chapter 14).
• The risks posed by climate change are typically less under low emissions than high emissions, but the 
difference varies from place to place depending on how close watersheds in a region are to the water 
shortage threshold. In some cases, risks are less under high emissions than low emissions, because 
larger increases in runoff are enough to push watersheds out of the water shortage category.
Production of this chapter was supported by the AVOID 2 programme (DECC) under contract 
reference 1104872.
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